We present a first-order probabilistic epistemic logic, which allows combining operators of knowledge and probability within a group of possibly infinitely many agents. We define its syntax and semantics and prove the strong completeness property of the corresponding axiomatic system. 1
INTRODUCTION
Reasoning about knowledge is widely used in many applied fields such as computer science, artificial intelligence, economics, game theory, and so on [3, 4, 20, 27] . A particular line of research concerns the formalization in terms of multi-agent epistemic logics, which speak about knowledge about facts, but also about knowledge of other agents. One of the central notions is that of common knowledge, which has been shown as crucial for a variety of applications dealing with reaching agreements or coordinated actions [23] . Intuitively, φ is common knowledge of a group of agents exactly when everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows . . . that φ is true.
However, it has been shown that in many practical systems common knowledge cannot be attained [19, 23] . This motivated some researchers to consider a weaker variant that still may be sufficient for carrying out a number of coordinated actions [27, 36, 42] . One of the approaches proposes a probabilistic variant of common knowledge [35] , which assumes that coordinated actions hold with high probability. Possible applications of probabilistic common knowledge are discussed in the context of practical distributed systems and cryptographic protocols in References [25, 27, 32] . A propositional logical system that formalizes that notion is presented in Reference [17] , where Fagin and Halpern developed a joint framework for reasoning about knowledge and probability and proposed a complete axiomatization.
We use Reference [17] as a starting point and generalize it in two ways: First, we extend the propositional formalization from Reference [17] by allowing reasoning about knowledge and probability of events expressible in a first-order language. We use the most general approach, allowing arbitrary combination of standard epistemic operators, probability operators, first-order quantifiers, and, in addition, of probabilistic common knowledge operator. The need for first-order extension is recognized by epistemic and probability logic communities. Wolter [49] pointed out that first-order common knowledge logics are of interest both from the point of view of applications and of pure logic. He argued that first-order base is necessary whenever the application domains are infinite (like in epistemic analysis of the playability of games with mixed strategies) or finite, but with the cardinality of which is not known in advance, which is a frequent case in the field of Knowledge Representation. Bacchus [5] gave the similar argument in the context of probability logics, arguing that, while a domain may be finite, it is questionable if there is a fixed upper bound on its size, and he also pointed out that there are many domains, interesting for AI applications, that are not finite.
Second, we consider infinite number of agents. While this assumption is not of interest in probability logic, it was studied in epistemic logic. Halpern and Shore [26] pointed out that economies, when regarded as teams in a game, are often modeled as having infinitely many agents and that such modeling in epistemic logic is also convenient in the situations where the group of agents and its upper limit are not known a priori.
The semantics for our logic consists of Kripke models enriched with probability spaces. Each possible world contains a first-order structure, and each agent in each world is equipped with a set of accessible worlds and a finitely additive probability on measurable sets of worlds. In this article, we consider the most general semantics, with independent modalities for knowledge and probability. Nevertheless, in Section 5.2, we show how to modify the definitions and results of our logic to capture some interesting relationships between the modalities for knowledge and probability (previously considered in Reference [17] ), especially the semantics in which agents assign probabilities only to the sets of worlds they consider possible.
The main result of this article is a sound and strongly complete ("every consistent set of sentences is satisfiable") axiomatization. The negative result of Wolter [49] shows that there is no finite way to axiomatize first-order common knowledge logics, and that infinitary axiomatizations are the best we can do (see Section 2.3). The same type of negative result for first-order probability logics is obtained by Abadi and Halpern [1] . We obtain completeness using infinitary rules of inference. Thus, formulas are finite, while only proofs are allowed to be (countably) infinite. We use a Henkinstyle construction of saturated extensions of consistent theories. From the technical point of view, we modify some of our earlier developed methods presented in References [12, 13, 15, 16, 34, 39, 40, 43 ]. 2 Although we use an alternative axiomatization for the epistemic part of logic (i.e., different from original axiomatization given in References [17, 24] ), we prove that standard axioms are derivable in our system.
There are several papers on completeness of epistemic logics with common knowledge.
In propositional case, a finitary axiomatization, which is weakly complete ("every consistent formula is satisfiable"), is obtained by Halpern and Moses [24] using a fixed-point axiom for common knowledge. However, strong completeness for any finitary axiomatization is impossible, due to lack of compactness (see Section 2.3). Strongly complete axiomatic systems are proposed in References [11, 45] . They contain an infinitary inference rule, similar to one of our rules, for capturing semantic relationship between the operators of group knowledge and common knowledge.
In first-order case, the set of valid formulas is not recursively enumerable [49] and, consequently, there is no complete finitary axiomatization. One way to overcome this problem is by including infinite formulas in the language as in Reference [46] . A logic with finite formulas, but an infinitary inference rule, is proposed in Reference [31] , while a Genzen-style axiomatization with an inifinitary rule is presented in Reference [45] . However, a finitary axiomatization of monadic fragments of the logic, without function symbols and equality, is proposed in Reference [44] .
Fagin and Halpern [17] proposed a joint frame for reasoning about knowledge and probability. Following the approach from Reference [18] , they extended the propositional epistemic language with formulas that express linear combinations of probabilities, i.e., the formulas of the form
They proposed a finitary axiomatization and proved weak completeness using the small-model theorem. Our axiomatization technique is different. Since in the first-order case a complete finitary axiomatization is not possible, we use infinitary rules and we prove strong completeness using the Henkin-style method. We use unary probability operators and we axiomatize the probabilistic part of our logic following the techniques from Reference [41] . In particular, our logic incorporates the single-agent probability logic LFOP 1 from Reference [40] . However, our approach can be easily extended to include linear combinations of probabilities, similarly as it was done in References [14, 38] .
Recently, some first-order logical systems have emerged dealing with common knowledge [7] and probabilistic beliefs [8, 9] , but no proof system is presented for those logics. References [7, 8] consider a so-called "only knowing" notion with the basic idea that the beliefs of an agent are precisely those inferred from its knowledge base, providing semantics without axiomatization. Reference [7] introduces a first-order multiagent logic with "only knowing" and common knowledge. Its propositional part without "only knowing" operator is proven to be related to the KC45 n logic (K45 modal logic with n agents and common knowledge [20, 30] ). The authors study the interactions between the notions of common knowledge and only knowing, providing an account of the muddy children puzzle as logical implications of what is only known initially. References [8, 9] consider single agent only with probabilistic beliefs (degrees of belief) in the presence of noisy sensing and acting using situation calculus. Roughly speaking, the degree of belief in formula ϕ is a normalized sum of the weights of the worlds where ϕ holds and can be thought of as a subjective probability (initially introduced in Reference [6] ). This notion can be expressed in our semantics, but we also allow different probability spaces across the worlds. In Reference [8] , a first-order logic with "only knowing" and degrees of belief that capture the beliefs of a fully introspective knowledge base via "only knowing" operator is proposed. Reference [9] takes into consideration that many robotic applications require continuous domains and overcomes the limitation of the degrees of belief being restricted to discrete probability distributions in Reference [6] by incorporating continuous densities in its approach.
We point out that all the above mentioned logics do not support an infinite group of agents, so the group knowledge operator is defined as the conjunction of knowledge of individual agents. A weakly complete axiomatization for common knowledge with infinite number of agents (in nonprobabilistic setting) is presented in Reference [26] . In our approach, the knowledge operators of groups and individual agents are related via an infinitary rule (RE from Section 3). It is used to overcome the non-compactness issue that appears in this extended framework with infinite number of agents (see Section 2.3 and Example 3.4).
To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the first logical framework with a proof system that combines reasoning about probability and epistemic reasoning in a first-order setting. As we already mentioned, the negative results from References [1, 49] show that it is not possible to obtain (even weakly) complete finite (recursive) axiomatization for this first-order framework. To achieve completeness, we propose an axiom system with infinitary rules of inference, and we combine and extend several existing approaches. We extend both the Henkin's method of constants for first-order logic [28] and our previously developed infinitary approaches for logics with possible world semantics [13, 14, 16, 39, 40] for establishing the strong completeness. We adopt the infinitary rule for connecting the epistemic operators of group knowledge and common knowledge from Reference [11] (the rule RC from Section 3) and generalize the standard Archimedean rule whose role is to controll the range of probability measures [41] (the rule RA from Section 3). In addition, we propose three novel infinitary rules: the rule RE, which relates group knowledge with knowledge of the members of the group, its probabilistic variant RPE, and RPC, which captures the semantic property of probabilistic common knowledge. Those three rules crucially contributed to the two novel aspects of this work:
• We propose the first axiomatization in the literature for a logic that includes the operator of probabilistic common knowledge. • We propose the first strongly complete axiomatization of epistemic logic with infinite groups of agents.
We adapted all the infinitary rules of inference by considering premises and conclusions in the form of k-nested implications (Definition 2.3) to prove strong necessitation of knowledge operators (Theorem 4.2), which is crucial for the proof of Truth lemma (Lemma 5.4). k-nested implications are already used in probabilistic, epistemic, and temporal logics for obtaining various strong necessitation results [11, 32, 34] . The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce Syntax and Semantics. Section 3 provides the axiomatization of our logic system, followed by the proofs of its soundness. In Section 4, we prove several theorems, including Deduction theorem and Strong necessitation. The completeness result is proven in Section 5. In Section 6, we consider an extension of our logic by incorporating the consistency condition [17] . The concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
SYNTAX AND SEMATICS
In this section, we present the syntax and semantics of our logic, which we call PCK f o . 3 Since the main goal of this article is to combine the epistemic first-order logic with reasoning about probability, our language extends a first-order language with both epistemic operators, and the operators for reasoning about probability and probabilistic knowledge. We introduce the set of formulas based on this language and the corresponding possible world semantics, and we define the satisfiability relation.
Syntax
Let [0, 1] Q be the set of rational numbers from the real interval [0, 1], N the set of non-negative integers, A an at-most countable set of agents, and G a countable set of nonempty subsets of A. The language L PCK f o of the logic PCK f o contains:
• a countable set of variables V ar = {x 1 , x 2 , . . .}, • m-ary relation symbols R m 0 , R m 1 , . . . and function symbols f m 0 , f m 1 , . . . for every integer m ≥ 0, • Boolean connectives ∧ and ¬, and the first-order quantifier ∀, • unary modal knowledge operators K i , E G , C G , for every i ∈ A and G ∈ G, • unary probability operator P i, ≥r and the operators for probabilistic knowledge
By the standard convention, constants are 0−ary function symbols. Terms and atomic formulas are defined in the same way as in the classical first-order logic. 
We use the standard abbreviations to introduce other Boolean connectives →, ∨, and ↔, the quantifier ∃, and the symbols ⊥, . We also introduce the operator K r i (for i ∈ A and r ∈ [0, 1] Q ) in the following way: the formula K r i φ abbreviates K i (P i, ≥r φ). The meanings of the operators of our logic are as follows:
• K i φ is read as "agent i knows φ" and E G φ as "everyone in the group G knows φ." The formula C G φ is read "φ is common knowledge among the agents in G," which means that everyone (from G) knows φ, everyone knows that everyone knows φ, and so on.
Example. The sentence "everyone in the group G knows that if agent i doesn't know φ, then ψ is common knowledge in G," is written as
• The probabilistic formula P i, ≥r φ says that the probability that formula φ holds is at least r according to the agent i. • K r i φ abbreviates the formula K i (P i, ≥r φ). It means that agent i knows that the probability of φ is at least r .
Example. Suppose that agent i considers two only possible scenarios for an event φ, and that each of these scenarios puts a different probability space on events. In the first scenario, the probability of φ is 1/2, and in the second one it is 1/4. Therefore, the agent knows that probability of φ is at least 1/4, i.e., K i (P i, ≥1/4 φ).
• E r G φ denotes that everyone in the group G knows that the probability of φ is at least r . Once K r i φ is introduced, E r G is defined as a straightforward probabilistic generalization of the operator E G . • C r G φ denotes that it is a common knowledge in the group G that the probability of φ is at least r . For a given threshold r ∈ [0, 1] Q , C r G represents a generalization of non-probabilistic operator C G .
Example. The formula E s G (K i (∃x )φ(x ) ∧ ¬C r G ψ ) says that everyone in the group G knows that the probability that both agent i knows that φ(x ) holds for some x, and that ψ is not common knowledge among the agents in G with probability at least r , is at least s. Definition 2.3 (k-nested Implication). Let τ ∈ For PCK f o be a formula and let k ∈ N. Let θ = (θ 0 , . . . , θ k ) be a sequence of k formulas, and X = (X 1 , . . . , X k ) a sequence of knowledge operators from {K i | i ∈ A}. The k-nested implication formula Φ k,θ,X (τ ) is defined inductively, as follows:
Formulas of this form are used to formulate infinitary inference rules that are essential in the axiomatization presented in Section 3. The need of k-nested implications in those rules comes directly from our completeness proof where they give a form of deep inference that is very similar to nested sequents [10] . Deep inference refers to deductive systems in which rules can not only be applied to outermost connectives but also be deep inside formulas.
The structure of these k-nested implications is shown to be especially convenient for the proof of the Deduction theorem (Theorem 4.1) and the Strong necessitation theorem (Theorem 4.2), as we discuss in Remark 2 and Remark 3.
Semantics
The semantic approach for PCK f o extends the classical possible-worlds model for epistemic logics, with probabilistic spaces.
Definition 2.4 (PCK f o Model).
A PCK f o model is a Kripke structure for knowledge and probability that is represented by a tuple M = (S, D, I , K , P), where:
• S is a nonempty set of states (or possible worlds); • D is a nonempty domain; • I associates an interpretation I (s) with each state s in S such that for all i ∈ A and all k, m ∈ N:
and write sK i t if t ∈ K i (s); • P associates to every agent i ∈ A and every state s ∈ S a probability space P (i, s) = (S i,s , χ i,s , μ i,s ), such that -S i,s is a non-empty subset of S, -χ i,s is an algebra of subsets of S i,s , whose elements are called measurable sets; and -μ i,s : χ i,s → [0, 1] is a finitely additive probability measure, i.e., * μ i,s (S i,s ) = 1, and
In the previous definition, we assume that the domain is fixed (i.e., the domain is same in all the worlds) and that the terms are rigid, i.e., for every model their meanings are the same in all worlds. Intuitively, the first assumption means that it is common knowledge that objects exist. Note that the second assumption implies that it is common knowledge which object a constant designates. As it is pointed out in Reference [44] , the first assumption is natural for all those application domains that deal not with knowledge about the existence of certain objects, but rather with knowledge about facts. Also, the two assumptions allow us to give semantics of probabilistic formulas, which is similar to the objectual interpretation for first-order modal logics [21] .
Note that those standard assumptions for modal logics are essential to ensure validity of all first-order axioms. For example, if the terms are not rigid, the classical first-order axiom
where the term t is free for x in φ, would not be valid (an example is given in Reference [22] ). Similarly, Barcan formula (axiom FO3 in Section 3) holds only for fixed domain models.
For a model M = (S, D, I , K , P) to be a PCK f o , the notion of variable valuation is defined in the usual way: a variable valuation v is a function that assigns the elements of the domain to the variables, i.e., v :
Definition 2.5 (Value of a Term). The value of a term t in a state s with respect to v, denoted by I (s)(t ) v , is defined in the following way:
. The next definition will use the following knowledge operators, which we introduce in the inductive way: 
for every m ∈ N Note that the satisfiability relation |= defined in Definition 2.6 is a partial relation, i.e., it is not in general defined for all formulas. Indeed, a formula of the form P i, ≥r φ can be evaluated only under assumption that the corresponding set of states
To keep the satisfiability relation total, i.e., well-defined for all the formulas, in this article, we consider only the models in which all those sets are measurable.
valuation v, state s, and agent i. We denote the class of all these models as
Remark 1. The semantic definition of the probabilistic common knowledge operator C r G from the last item of Definition 2.6 is first proposed by Fagin and Halpern in Reference [17] , as a generalization of the operator C G regarded as the infinite conjunction of all degrees of group knowledge. It is important to mention that this is not the only proposal for generalizing the nonprobabilistic case. Monderer and Samet [35] proposed a more intuitive definition, where probabilistic common knowledge is semantically equivalent to the infinite conjunction of the formulas
Although both are legitimate probabilistic generalizations, in this article, we accept the definition of Fagin and Halpern [17] , who argued that their proposal seems more adequate for the analysis of problems such as probabilistic coordinated attack and Byzantine agreement protocols [27] . As we point out in the Conclusion, our axiomatization approach can be easily modified to capture the definition of Monderer and Samet.
Note that in the previous definition the satisfiability of sentences does not depend on a valuation, since they do not contain any free variable.
Observe that if φ is a sentence, then the set [φ] v i,s does not depend on v; thus, we relax the notation by denoting it by
Axiomatization Issues
At the end of this section, we analyze two common characteristics of epistemic logics and probability logics, which have impacts on their axiomatizations.
The first one is the non-compactness phenomenon-there are unsatisfiable sets of formulas such that all their finite subsets are satisfiable. The existence of such sets in epistemic logic is a consequence of the fact that the common knowledge operator C G can be semantically seen as an infinite conjunction of all the degrees of the group knowledge operator E G , which leads to the example
In real-valued probability logics, a standard example of unsatisfiable set whose finite subsets are all satisfiable is
where φ is a satisfiable sentence that is not valid.
Apart from those two classical examples of non-compactness of epistemic and probability logics, this specific work faces three additional sources of non-compactness. The first two are due to the fact that there might exist an infinite group of agents G ∈ G:
while the third is due to the presence of operators of probabilistic common knowledge:
One significant consequence of non-compactness is that there is no finitary axiomatization that is strongly complete [48] , i.e., simple completeness is the most one can achieve.
In the first-order case, the situation is even worse. Namely, the set of valid formulas is not recursively enumerable, neither for first-order logic with common knowledge [49] nor for first-order probability logics [1] (moreover, even their monadic fragments suffer from the same drawback [41, 49] ). This means that there is no finitary axiomatization that could be (even simply) complete. An approach for overcoming this issue, proposed by Wolter [49] and Ognjanovic and Raskovic [39] , is to consider infinitary logics as the only interesting alternative.
In this article, we introduce the axiomatization with ω-rules (inference rules with countably many premises) [11, 40] . This allows us to keep the object language countable and to move infinity to meta language only: The formulas are finite, while only proofs are allowed to be infinite.
THE AXIOMATIZATION Ax P C K f o
In this section, we introduce the axiomatic system for the logic PCK 
φ ∀xφ II Axioms and rules for reasoning about knowledge
, r ∈ (0, 1] Q (Archimedean rule) IV Axioms and rules for reasoning about probabilistic knowledge
The given axioms and rules are divided into four groups, according to the type of reasoning. The first group contains the standard axiomatization for first-order logic and, in addition, a variant of the well-known axiom for modal logics, called Barcan formula. It is proved that Barcan formula holds in the class of all first-order fixed domain modal models, and that it is independent from the other modal axioms [29, 30] . The second group contains axioms and rules for epistemic reasoning. AK and RK are classical Distribution axiom and Necessitation rule for the knowledge operator. The axiom AE and the rule RE are novel; they properly relate the knowledge operators and the operator of group knowledge E G , regardless of the cardinality of the group G. Similarly, AC and RC properly relate the operators E G and C G . The infinitary rule RC is a generalization of the rule In f C from Reference [11] . The third group contains a multi-agent variant of a standard axiomatization for reasoning about probability [41] . The infinitary rule RA is a variant of the so-called Archimedean rule, generalized by incorporating the k-nested implications in a similar way as it has been done in Reference [34] in purely probabilistic settings. This rule informally says that if probability of a formula is considered by an agent i to be arbitrarily close to some number r , then, according to the agent i, the probability of the fomula must be equal to r . The last group consists of novel axioms and rules that allow reasoning about probabilistic knowledge. They properly capture the semantic relationship between the operators K r i , E r G , F r G , and C r G , and they are in spirit similar to the last four axioms and rules from the second group.
Altogether, our axiomatization contains five infinitary rules of inference; they directly correspond to the five sources of non-compactness of our logic, identified in Section 2.3-each of them can be used to formally prove the inconsistency of the corresponding example of an unsatisfiable set (we illustrate that fact by Example 3.4, for the rule RE). Note that those sets would be consistent under any finitary axiomatization.
Note that we use the structure of these k-nested implications in all of our infinitary inference rules. As we have already mentioned, the reason is that this form allows us to prove the Deduction theorem and Strong necessitation theorem. Note that by choosing k = 0, θ 0 = in the inference rules RE, RC, RPE, RPC, we obtain the intuitive forms of the rules:
Next, we define some basic notions of proof theory.
and every φ i is an instance of some axiom schemata or is obtained from the preceding formulas by an inference rule.
A formula φ is derivable from a setT of formulas (T φ) if there is an at-most countable sequence of formulas φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , φ λ+1 (λ is a finite or countable ordinal) such that φ λ+1 = φ, and each φ i is an instance of some axiom schemata or a formula from the set T , or it is obtained from the previous formulas by an inference rule, with the exception that the premises of the inference rules RK and RP must be theorems. The corresponding sequence of formulas is a proof for φ from T .
A set of formulas T is deductively closed if it contains all the formulas derivable from T , i.e., φ ∈ T whenever T φ.
Obviously, a formula is a theorem iff it is derivable from the empty set. Now, we introduce the notions of consistency and maximal consistency.
It is easy to see that T is inconsistent iff T ⊥. In the proof of completeness theorem, we will use a special type of maximal consistent set, called saturated sets. if ¬(∀x )φ(x ) ∈ T , then there is a term t such that ¬φ(t ) ∈ T .
Note the notions of deductive closeness, maximal consistency, and saturates sets are defined for formulas, but they can be defined for theories (sets of sentences) in the same way. We omit the formal definitions here, since they would have the identical form as the ones above, but we will use the mentioned notions in the following sections. Now, we show an example of how the infinitary rules are used in practice.
Example 3.4. Let us show that the set T = {K i φ | i ∈ G} ∪ {¬E G φ} of formulas saying that each member of some (possibly infinite) group G knows φ and that the whole group G does not know φ is an inconsistent set with respect to our axiomatization:
by RE for k = 0 and θ = (4) T ⊥, from (1) and (3).
The following result shows that the proposed axioms from Ax PCK f o are valid, and the inference rules preserve validity. 
RC. We will prove by induction on
, for each state s and valuation v of any Kripke structure M: . Induction base k = 0. This case follows by the properties of the real numbers. 
, which contradicts (*).
SOME THEOREMS OF PCK f o
In this section, we prove several theorems. Some of them will be useful in proving the completeness of the axiomatization Ax PCK f o . We start with the deduction theorem. Since we will frequently use this theorem, we will not always explicitly mention it in the proofs. Proof. We use the transfinite induction on the length of the proof of ψ from T ∪ {φ}. The case ψ = φ is obvious; if ψ is an axiom, then ψ , so T ψ , and therefore T φ → ψ . If ψ was obtained by rule RK, i.e., ψ = K i φ where φ is a theorem, then K i φ (by R2); that is, ψ , so T φ → ψ . The reasoning is analogous for cases of other inference rules that require a theorem as a premise. Now, we consider the case where ψ was obtained by rule RPC. The proof for the other infinitary rules is similar.
Let
, for all m ∈ N, by the induction hypothesis.
. Then, we have:
The case k = 0 follows in a similar way.
Remark 2 (Implicative form of the Infinitary Rules). Note that the proof of the Deduction theorem relies on the fact that the infinitary rules of inference are given in the implicative form, i.e., all the formulas in the premises and the conclusion of (every instance of) a rule are implications with the same antecedent. This is a standard technical solution that ensures that the Deduction theorem can be proved using the transfinite induction on the length of the inference. They are used, among others, in probabilistic, temporal, and epistemic logic, in the approaches when strong completeness theorems are obtained using infinitary rules to overcome non-compactness issues of the logics [2, 11, 13, 33, 38] .
Let us explain the intuition behind the use of implicative forms. Suppose that the rule
intuitively captures some specific non-compactness issue (e.g., in this article, we consider
to describe probabilistic common knowledge operator). In the inductive proof of the Deduction theorem, in the case when T , θ ψ is obtained by an application of the rule (4.2), we need to use the induction hypothesis T , θ ψ m ⇒ T θ → ψ m , for every m ≥ 0. Then the implicative form (with antecedent θ ) is an obstacle to directly apply the rule (4.2) on the set {θ → ψ m | m ≥ 0} to infer T θ → ψ . For that reason, the rule (4.2) is relaxed to include all inferences of the form
for every formula φ. This modification allows us to concludeT (θ ∧ φ) → ψ m fromT , θ φ → ψ m in the induction step, using the tautology (4.1) for every m ≥ 0. Then, we can apply the instance
of (4.3) and finally conclude θ → (φ → ψ ) using (4.1). Note that this proof strategy requires only the implicative form of the rule, while nesting of knowledge operators is not used in the proof of the Deduction theorem. However, the nesting of those operators is necessary for the proof of the Strong necessitation theorem (Theorem 4.2), and we discuss its use in Remark 3.
Next, we prove several results about the purely epistemic part of our logic. First, we show that the strong variant of necessitation for knowledge operator is a consequence of the axiomatization Ax PCK f o . This theorem will have an important role in the proof of completeness theorem, in the construction of the canonical model.
First, we need to introduce some notation. For a given set of formulas T and i ∈ A, we define the set K i T as the set of all formulas K i φ, where φ belongs to T , i.e.,
Theorem 4.2 (Strong Necessitation). If T is a theory and T φ, then
Proof. Let T φ. We will prove K i T K i φ using the transfinite induction on the length of proof of T φ. Here, we will only consider the application of rules FOR and RPC, while the cases when we apply the other infinitary rules are similar to the proof for RCP.
(1) Suppose that T φ, where φ = (∀x )ψ , was obtained from T ψ by the inference rule FOR. Then: T ψ by the assumption K i T K i ψ by the induction hypothesis K i T (∀x )K i ψ by FOR K i T K i (∀x )ψ by Barcan formula.
(2) Suppose that T φ where φ = Φ k,θ,X (C r G ψ ) was derived by application of RPC. Then:
where θ = (θ, ) and X = (X, K i ). Infinitary Rules) . Note that in a finitary axiom system, the Strong necessitation theorem would be a direct consequence of the Necessitation inference rule and Distribution axiom, due to the fact that any proof uses a finite set of premises.
Remark 3 (k−nested Formulas in the
In the presence of the rules of the form (4.2), the derivations can be infinite and the proof that T ψ implies K i T K i ψ , by induction on the length of the proof T ψ , must also include the case of application of Equation (4.2), assuming T ψ m for every m ≥ 0. In the induction step, we use the hypothesis that K i T K i ψ m , for every m. Then the presence of knowledge operator K i prevents us to directly apply Equation (4.2) on the set {K i ψ m | m ≥ 0} to infer K i T K i ψ . For that reason, it is convenient to generalize the rule (4.2) by allowing all inferences of the form
for every integer n and every block of knowledge operators K i n K i n−1 . . . K i 1 . With this modification, the case of application of Equation (4.4) in the inductive proof would be considered as follows: Let us denote K = K i n K i n−1 . . This idea is directly applied to the case (2) (rule RPC) in the previous proof, and it can be applied in the same way for the remaining three infinitary rules. Since the rules must formally be in an implicative form because of the Deduction theorem (see Remark 2), we used the implication with the antecedent .
In our approach, we need to meet both requirements of implicative forms and nesting of knowledge operators, i.e., our infinitary rules must generalize both Equations (4.3) and (4.4), which directly leads to our form of k-nested implication in Definition 2.3.
As a consequence, we also obtain strong necessitation for the operators of group knowledge. As we will see later, this result is necessary to prove so-called fixed-point axiom for common knowledge operator.
Proof. Let T φ. For every i ∈ G, we have E G T K i T by the axiom AE, and K i T K i φ, by Theorem 4.2. Since by the rule RE, where we choose k = 0 and θ 0 = , we have
and we obtain E G T E G φ. Now, we show that some standard properties of epistemic operators can be proved in Ax PCK f o . Proposition 4.4. Let φ, ψ , φ j , j = 1, . . . ,m be formulas, i ∈ A and G ∈ G. Then:
Proof.
(1) follows directly from AK.
(2) We use the following derivation:
(3) Let us first prove, using the induction on n, that
holds for every m ∈ N. Induction base is proved in the previous part of this proposition (2). Induction step:
, by previous two. Thus, Equation (4.5) holds. Next, 
(by the previous part of the proposition (4)) Therefore, by the Deduction theorem, we have that
, by previous two and the previous part (5) of the proposition.
Note that (3) and (6) (the fixed-point axiom) are two standard axioms of epistemic logic with common knowledge [17, 24] . The axiom (3) is often written in an equivalent form
The previous result shows that they are provable in our axiomatic system Ax PCK f o .
The standard axiomatization for epistemic logics (with finitely many agents) [17, 24] also includes one axiom for group knowledge operator, which states that group knowledge E G φ is equivalent to the conjunction of K i φ, where all the agents i from the group are considered. The next result shows that both that axiom and its probabilistic variant hold in our logic. Proposition 4.5. Let φ be a formula, r ∈ [0, 1] Q , and let G ∈ G be a finite set of agents. Then the following hold:
(1) From the axiom AE, using propositional reasoning, we can obtain
However, from the inference rule RE, choosing k = 0 and θ 0 = , we obtain
(2) This result can be proved in the same way as the first statement, using the obvious analogies between the axioms AE and APE, and the rules RE and RPE.
Note that the distribution properties of the epistemic operators K i , E G , and C G , proved in Proposition 4.4 (1)-(3), cannot be directly transferred to the properties of the corresponding operators of probabilistic knowledge. For example, it is easy to see that
is not a valid formula. 5 Nevertheless, we can prove that probabilistic versions of knowledge, group knowledge, and common knowledge are closed under consequences. Proposition 4.6. Let φ and ψ be formulas such that φ → ψ . Let r ∈ [0, 1] Q , i ∈ A, and G ∈ G. Then:
(1) Note that
by Proposition 4.4 (1) . From the assumption φ → ψ , applying the rule RP and then the rule RK, we obtain
Note that ¬φ ∨ ¬⊥ (a propositional tautology), so
, by (4.8) using the instance P i, ≥0 ¬⊥ of P1.
(4.10)
The formula P i, ≥r (φ ∨ ⊥) denotes P i, ≥r ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬⊥), which is the same as P i, ≥1−(1−r ) ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬⊥), and can be abbreviated as P i, ≤1−r (¬φ ∧ ¬⊥). Similarly, ¬P i, ≥r ¬¬φ denotes P i, <r ¬¬φ. From P5, we obtain (P i, ≤1−r (¬φ ∧ ¬⊥) ∧ P i, <r ¬¬φ) → P i, <1 ((¬φ ∧ ¬⊥) ∨ ¬¬φ). 5 However, it can be shown that the formula
is valid and it is a theorem of our logic (see (4.17) ).
Since P i, ≥1 (¬(φ ∧ ¬⊥) ∨ ¬¬φ) denotes ¬P i, <1 ((¬φ ∧ ¬⊥) ∨ ¬¬φ), from (4.9), we have (P i, ≤1−r (¬φ ∧ ¬⊥) ∧ P i, <r ¬¬φ) → P i, <1 ((¬φ ∧ ¬⊥) ∨ ¬¬φ) ∧ ¬P i, <1 ((¬φ ∧ ¬⊥)∨ ¬¬φ)), by P5, and therefore P i, ≤1−r (¬φ ∧ ¬⊥) → P i, <r ¬¬φ, i.e.,
(4.11)
From (4.10) and (4.11), we obtain P i, ≥r (φ) → P i, ≥r ¬¬φ. The negation of the formula
, a contradiction. Thus, the formula (4.12) is a theorem of our axiomatization. By applying the rule RK to the theorem, we obtain
(4.13)
From (4.6) and (4.13), we obtain
By Proposition 4.4(1), we have
From (4.14) and (4.15), we obtain
Finally, from (4.7) and (4.16), we obtain K r i φ → K r i ψ . (2) We start with the following derivation:
(4.17) by the Deduction theorem. From (4.8), using the rule RPE, we obtain
Finally, from (4.17) and (4.18), we obtain
) holds for every m. We prove the claim by induction.
Induction base follows trivially, since (F r
follows from the Deduction theorem. Next, we prove several results about maximal consistent sets with respect to our axiomatic system. Those results will be useful in proving the Truth lemma. (1) for every formula φ, exactly one of φ and ¬φ is in T ,
Proof. Lemma 4.7(4) , because V is maximal consistent. For the other direction, if K i φ ∈ V for all i ∈ G, and, since {K i φ | i ∈ G} E G φ (by the rule RE, where k = 0 and θ 0 = ), we have that E G φ ∈ V , by Lemma 4.7 (2) .
The cases (2), (3), and (4) can be proved in a similar way, by replacing E G φ, K i φ, for all i ∈ G, axiom AE, and rule RE with E r G φ, K r i φ, for all i ∈ G, APE, RPE (case (2)), C G φ, (E G ) m φ, for all m ∈ N, AC, RC (case (3)), and C r G φ, (F r G ) m φ for all m ∈ N, APC, RPC (case (4)), respectively.
COMPLETENESS
In this section, we prove that the axiomatic system Ax PCK f o is strongly complete with respect to the class of measurable M M EAS A models. We will use Henkin-style construction [28] , extending our language with infinitely many new constant symbols, known as witnessing constants, in a particular manner. We prove completeness in three main steps:
• First, we prove Lindenbaum's theorem, i.e., we show how to extend a consistent set of sentences T to a saturated maximal consistent set of sentences T * step-by-step, in an infinite process, considering in each step one sentence and checking its consistency with the considered theory in that step. Due to the presence of infinitary rules, we modify the standard completion technique in the case that the considered sentence can be derived by an infinitary rule, by adding the negation of one of the premises of the rule. Such a premise always exists, for every considered infinitary rule, due to the presence of the Deduction theorem. We will discuss further necessity of this modification of the standard completion technique in Remark 4. • Second, we use saturated sets to construct a special PCK f o model M * , which we will call the canonical model, and we show that it belongs to the class M M EAS A . The states of this model correspond to saturated theories. The key step in proving that M * is a measurable model is the Truth lemma (Lemma 5.4), which ensures that a formula belongs to a saturated theory iff it is satisfied in the corresponding state of the canonical model. The proof of the lemma is by induction on complexity of the formula, and the important case when a formula is obtained by application of a knowledge operator essentially depends on the Strong necessitation theorem.
• Finally, using the saturation T * of the considered theory T , we show that T is satisfiable in the corresponding state s T * of the canonical model.
Lindenbaum's Theorem
We start with the Henkin construction of saturated extensions of theories. For that purpose, we consider a broader language, obtained by adding countably many novel constant symbols. First, we motivate our modification of the standard proof strategy.
Remark 4. The standard process of extending a theory to a maximal consistent theory assumes an enumeration {φ i | i ∈ N} of all sentences, and in the step k of the process the formula φ k is considered and added to the current theory in the case that it is consistent with it. This standard infinite process is not directly applicable if the axiomatization contains infinitary rules of inference, as the resulting theory might be inconsistent even if in each step we ensure consistency. To illustrate that fact, let us consider the theory T 0 = {¬C r G φ}, for some sentence φ, and the se-
For that reason, we modify the procedure by considering an enumeration of all sentences and adding, in the case when the considered sentence can be derived by an infinitary rule, the negation of one of the premises of the rule. We will see in the proof of the following result that such a premise always exists, as a consequence of the Deduction theorem. 
which contradicts the consistency of T j .
If we would suppose T is inconsistent, i.e., T * ⊥, then we would have ⊥ ∈ T * , since T * is deductively closed. Therefore, there would be some i such that ⊥ ∈ T i , which is impossible. Thus, T * is consistent.
Finally, the step (b6) of the construction guarantees that the theory T * is saturated in the extended language L * .
Canonical Model
Now, we construct a special Kripke structure whose set of states consists of saturated theories. First, we need to introduce some notation. For a given set of formulas T and i ∈ A, we define the set T /K i as the set of all formulas φ, such that K i φ belongs to T , i.e., 
• D is the set of all variable-free terms;
is an interpretation such that:
-for each function symbol f k j , I (s)(f k j ) is a function from D k to D such that for all variablefree terms t 1 , . . . , t k , I (s)(f k j ) :(t 1 , . . . , t k )→ f k j (t 1 , . . . , t k ), -for each relational symbol R k j ,
Note that the sets [φ] i,s in the definition of the canonical mode actually do not depend on i and s, so in the rest of this section, we will sometimes relax the notation by omitting the subscript.
Also, since there is a bijection between saturated theories and states of the canonical model, we will often write just s when we denote either state of the corresponding saturated theory. For example, we can write the last item of the definition above as
Now, we will show that M * is a well-defined PCK f o model, i.e., that:
• (i, s) is a is a probability space.
(1) If [φ] i,s = [ψ ] i,s , then φ and ψ belong to the same saturated theories, so φ ≡ ψ . From φ → ψ , we obtain P i, ≥1 (φ → ψ ) by RA, and therefore for every r , we have P i, ≥r φ → P i, ≥r ψ by (4.12). Consequently, P i, ≥r φ → P i, ≥r ψ ∈ s. If P i, ≥r φ ∈ s, then, by Lemma 4.7(4), also P i, ≥r ψ ∈ s. Therefore, sup {r | P i, ≥r ψ ∈ s} ≥ sup {r | P i, ≥r φ ∈ s}. In the same way, we can prove sup {r | P i, ≥r ψ ∈ s} ≤ sup {r | P i, ≥r φ ∈ s} using ψ → φ.
(2) First, we show that for each agent i ∈ A and s ∈ S, the class 
. Therefore, each χ i,s is an algebra of subsets of S i,s . Note that from the axiom P i, ≥o φ, we can obtain
Then, by P2, P i, ≤q φ and P i, ≥1−q ¬φ ∈ s. However, if there is a rational q ∈ [0, r ) such that P i, ≥1−q ¬φ ∈ s, then ¬P i, >q ∈ s, which is a contradiction. Therefore, sup {r | P i,
Suppose that q, l > 0. Because of supremum and monotonicity properties, for all rational numbers q ∈ [0, q) and l ∈ [0, l ): P i, ≥q φ, P i, ≥l ψ ∈ s. Then, P i, ≥q +l (φ ∨ ψ ) ∈ s by P4. Therefore, q + l ≤ sup {r | P i, ≥r (φ ∨ ψ ) ∈ s}. If q + l = 1, then the statement is obviously valid. Suppose q + l < 1. If q + l < r 0 =≤ sup {r | P i, ≥r (φ ∨ ψ ) ∈ s}, then for each rational r ∈ (q + l, r 0 ), P i, ≥r (φ ∨ ψ ) ∈ s. Let us choose rational q > q and s > s such that ¬P i, ≥q φ, P i, <q φ ∈ s, ¬P i, ≥l ψ , P i, <l ψ ∈ s and q + l = r ≤ 1. Then, P i, ≤q φ ∈ s by the axiom P3. And by P5, we have
). Finally, let us assume that q = 0 or l = 0. In that case, we can repeat the previous reasoning by taking either q = 0 or l = 0.
The previous result still does not ensure that M * belongs to the class M M EAS A . Indeed, in Definition 5.2, the sets [φ] from χ i,s are defined using φ ∈ T , and not (M * , s T ) |= φ. However, the following lemma shows that the former and latter coincide: Lemma 5.4 (Truth Lemma). Let T be a saturated theory. Then,
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The problem is that M * does not belong to the class M M EAS,CO N A , since the condition S i,s ⊆ K i (s) is not ensured. Nevertheless, we can use M * to obtain a model M * from M M EAS,CO N A , in which T is also satisfied. We define M * by modifying only the probability spaces P (i, s) = (S i,s , χ i,s , μ i,s ) from M * (i.e., S, D, I , and K are the same in both structures) in the following way: M * = (S, D, I , K , P ), such that
Now it only remains to prove that M * is a model, i.e., that each P (i, s) is a probability space, since the rest of the proof is trivial: S i,s ⊆ K i (s) obviously holds, and (M * , s T * ) |= T is ensured by the construction of P , and the fact that (M * , s T * ) |= T . First, we show that every χ i,s is an algebra of sets using the corresponding results from the proof of Lemma 5.3(2)
Finally, we prove that μ i,s is a finitely additive probability measure, for every i and s. Remark 5. Apart from consistency condition, Fagin and Halpern [17] consider other relations between the sample space S i,s and possible worlds K i (s), which model some typical situations in the multi-agent systems. They also provide their characterization by the corresponding axioms.
First they analyze the situations in which the probabilities of the events are common knowledge, i.e, there is a unique, collective, and objective view on the probability of the events. Then the agents in the same state share the same known probability spaces, which is captured by the condition of objectivity: P (i, s) = P (j, s) for all i, j, and s. Second, they model the situation where an agent uses the same probability space in all the worlds he considers possible. This situation occurs when no nonprobabilistic choices are made to cause different probability distributions in the possible worlds. The corresponding condition, called state determined property, says that if t ∈ K i (s), then P (i, s) = P (i, t ).
Third, sometimes the nonprobabilistic choices happen and induce varied probability spaces. Then the possible worlds could be divided into partitions that share the same probability distributions, after such choice has been made. This case is specified by the condition of uniformity: if P (i, s) = (S i,s , χ i,s , μ i,s ) and t ∈ S i,s , then P (i, s) = P (i, t ).
Similarly as we have done with the consistency condition, we can also characterize the three above mentioned conditions by adding corresponding axioms to our axiomatic system. It is straightforward to check that the following axioms, which are similar to the ones proposed in Reference [17] , capture the mentioned relations between modalities of knowledge and probability: P i, ≥r φ → P j, ≥r φ (objectivity), P i, ≥r φ → K i P i, ≥r φ (state determined property), P i, ≥r φ → P i, ≥1 P i, ≥r φ (uniformity).
CONCLUSION
The starting points for our research were References [17, 26] , where weakly complete axiomatizations for a propositional logic combining knowledge and probability, and a non-probabilistic propositional logic for knowledge with infinitely many agents (respectively), are presented. We combine those two approaches and extend both of them to the logic PCK f o with an expressive first-order language. We provide a sound and strongly complete axiomatization Ax PCK f o for the corresponding semantics of PCK f o . Since any reasonable, semantically defined first-order epistemic logic with common knowledge is not recursively axiomatizable [49] , we propose the axiomatization with infinitary rules of inference, and we obtain completeness modifying the standard Henkin construction of saturated extensions of consistent theories. In the logic PCK f o , we consider the most general semantics, with independent modalities for knowledge and probability. We also show how to extend the set of axioms and modify the axiomatization technique to capture models in which agents assign probabilities only to the sets of worlds they consider possible. We also give hints how to extend our axiomatization in several different ways to capture other interesting relationships between the modalities for knowledge and probability, considered in Reference [17] .
In this article, we use the semantic definition of the probabilistic common knowledge operator C r G proposed by Fagin and Halpern [17] . As we have mentioned in Section 2.2, Monderer and Samet [35] proposed a different definition, where probabilistic common knowledge is equivalent to the infinite conjunction of the formulas E r G φ, (E r G ) 2 φ, (E r G ) 3 φ . . . It is easy to check that our axiomatization Ax PCK f o can be easily modified to capture the definition of Monderer and Samet. Namely, the axiom APC and rule RPC should be replaced with the axiom C r G φ → (E r G ) m φ, m ∈ N and the inference rule
. Finally, although this article is focused on the issue of providing a strongly complete axiomatization, we should also mention that logics of this type could be used to reason about various distributed systems with interacting agents [20] . More recently, Reference [32] proposes a temporal epistemic logic with a non-rigid set of agents for analyzing the blockchain protocol, while for the same protocol Reference [25] uses common knowledge about probabilities to describe conditions for achieving consensus on a public ledger. It may happen that probabilistic common knowledge can provide additional insight into the convergence for reaching the consensus in that framework.
